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NOTES
Enforcement of Money Alimony Decree by Equity Process in a
Foreign State
W, having obtained a money alimony decree in F-i,1 seeks the enforcement
of that decree in F-2 by its court of equity, because H has fled into that jurisdic-
tion. What should be the attitude of the F-2 equity court? Does the full faith
and credit clause 2 require the foreign court to accord the same means of execu-
tion as that obtaining in the state of rendition, when such foreign court recognizes
the validity of the divorce 3 and the alimony claim? I
It is well settled that an action at law may be instituted upon a foreign money
alimony decree if it possesses the elements of definiteness and finality which are
prerequisites of any judgment.5 It is also clear that full faith and credit must be
extended such a decree in a suit at law for the accrued installments, 6 or for a lump
sum award, provided the claim is not subject to modification.7
It was early said by the U. S. Supreme Court: "To give it (F-i judgment)
the force of a judgment in another state, it must be made a judgment there; and
can only be executed in the latter state as its laws may permit." s This language,
which was quoted in Lynde v. Lynde,9 appears not to preclude a "judgment"
from being an F-2 equity decree. Further, the words "as its laws may permit"
I. For the sake of clarity and brevity, the symbols F-i, referring to the first forum, and
P-2, denoting the second forum or state in which suit is brought on a decree obtained in an-
other jurisdiction, will be used. Thus, if a judgment recovered in Ohio is sued on in New
York, Ohio is F-i and New York is F-2.
2. U. S. CoNsT. Art. IV, § I.
3. Full faith and credit must be extended divorce decrees rendered at the domicile of
both parties. Cheely v. Clayton, 11o U. S. 701 (1884). See GOoDRICH, ComIcT OF LAws
(1927) § 125. Or at the domicile of one party, the other being personally served within the
state, or appearing. Cheever v. Wilson, 9 Wall. io8 (U. S. 1869) ; see Haddock v. Haddock,
201 U. S. 562, 570 (1905) ; 3 FREEMAN, JUDGMENTS (5th ed. 1925) § 1430. Or at the last
matrimonial domicile with proper notice to defendant,-the last matrimonial domicile being
that last shared by both parties as man and wife. Haddock v. Haddock, 201 U. S. 562
(1905) ; Beischer v. Beischer, 226 App. Div. 454, 235 N. Y. Supp. 652 (4th Dep't, 1929) ; 3
FREEMAN, op. cit. supra, at § 1431. But if neither party is domiciled therein, the court is
without jurisdiction, and the divorce is void and has no legal effect in any other state. Streit-
wolf v. Streitwolf, 181 U. S. 179 (igoi) ; Keil v. Keil, 8o Neb. 496, 114 N. W. 570 (19o8).
4. The court must have had personal jurisdiction over the defendant to make an alimony
award binding on him. 2 BISHOP, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE & SEPARATION (189 i ) §§ 78, 79;
GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 133.
5. 2 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, § io65.
6. Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U. S. 183 (19Ol) ; Lynde v. Lynde, 162 N. Y. 405, 56 N. E. 979
(19oo) ; GOODRICH, op. cit. supra note 3, § 134.
7. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. I (191o) ; RESTATEMENT, CONFLICT OF LAws (1934)
§ 464. In Holton v. Holton, 153 Minn. 346, igo N. W. 542 (1922), full faith and credit was
granted although the alimony was subject to modification. However, it is generally held that
even though P-s might modify, installments that have accrued are vested debts. Lynde v.
Lynde, 181 U. S. 183 (igol). But see Barclay v. Barclay, 184 Ill. 375, 377, 56 N. E. 636,
637 (1900).
8. McElmoyle v. Cohen, 13 Pet. 312, 325 (U. S. 1839).
q. 18i U. S. 183, 187 (igoo).
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seem to indicate that F-2 may give equitable enforcement to the F-i decree if its
legal machinery is so adapted.1"
Since 1927 a series of decisions has indicated that F-2 will allow the use of
its equity process to enforce a foreign alimony decree. This recent trend was
inaugurated by the case of Fanchier v. Gammill, l in which a divorced wife filed
a bill for alimony under a Nevada decree. The Mississippi court felt that the
full faith and credit clause required it to "establish" the foreign decree and
enforce it by equitable process. The court then reasoned that an alimony decree
ought to receive the advantage of extraordinary means of enforcement anyway
.son account of the character of a judgment for alimony, which rests, to some
extent, upon public policy, in requiring a husband to support his wife and children
due to the sacred human relationships .... ," 12 Later decisions attaining this
result, although citing Fanchier v. Gammill as persuasive authority, did not base
their opinions upon the requirement of full faith and credit.'3 "In fact, it is
dearly settled that a state is not obligated to afford any different relief to a for-
eign money alimony decree than it accords to any money judgment rendered in a
foreign court of law.1
4
While some cases have held that an action at law lies for accrued alimony
installments, it does not necessarily follow that such a holding denies the use of
equitable process,' 5 although some courts have expressly denied the jurisdiction
of equty to act on a foregn decree. 6 Those courts that have refused their equi-
table assistance in the enforcement of an F-i decree for either a lump sum or
accrued installments have maintained that the foreign decree constitutes a
"debt of record" which is enforceable only at law, since an "adequate remedy"
is provided there. However, the phrase "debt of record" was originated early
in our history to enable a person who was awarded a money equity decree
lO. It cannot be argued that a foreign court should extend remedies which it is not em-
powered to exercise in the enforcement of its own decrees. GooDacH, op. cit. suPra note 3,
§ 207.
II. 148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927), 41 HARv. L. REv. 798.
12. Id. at 737, 114 So. at 814.
13. Creager v. Superior Ct. of Santa Clara County, 126 Cal. App. 280, 14 Pac. (2d) 552
(1932), 81 U. OF PA. L. REv. 342 (1933) ; Ostrander v. Ostrander, 190 Minn. 547, 252 N. W.
449 (1934) ; Shibley v. Shibley, 181 Wash. 166, 42 Pac. (2d) 446 (1935) ; German v. Ger-
man, 188 Atl. 429 (Conn. I916). Whether Massachusetts is in accord with the foregoing
states is a moot question as a result of the decision in Weidman v. Weidman, 274 Mass. 118,
174 N. E. 206 (1931), in which it was held that Massachusetts was not required by the full
faith and credit clause to enforce in equity a judgment for alimony rendered by a court of a
sister state in a suit wherein the marriage was not dissolved. It is to be noted, however, that
obligations of a similar nature could not be enforced by a wife against her husband in equity
in Massachusetts even though the obligation were created by its own court [2 MAss. GEN.
LAWS (1932) c. 209, § 6] ; and the decision was based specifically upon this ground rather
than upon the fact that it was a foreign alimony decree. Thus it may be that the Weidman
v. Weidman holding applies only where there has been no final divorce in the sister state.
14. Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U. S. I (igo) ; Bennett v. Bennett, 63 N. J. Eq. 3o6, 49 AtI.
5oi (1903).
15. Wagner v. Wagner, 26 R. I. 27, 57 At. 1O58 (1904). See (1932) lO CHI-KENT
REV. 266. And the fact that the law has taken over a remedy formerly given only in equity
does not preclude equity jurisdiction. i PomERoY, EQUITy JURISPRUDENCE (3d ed. 1905)
§62.
16. Grant v. Grant, 75 F. (2d) 665 (App. D. C. 1935) ; Worsley v. Worsley, 76 F. (2d)
815 (App. D. C. 1935) ; Page v. Page, 189 Mass. 85, 75 N. E. 92 (1905) ; Bennett v. Bennett,
63 N. J. Eq. 306, 49 AtI. 501 (igoI) ; Lynde v. Lynde, 41 App. Div. 280, 58 N. Y. Supp.
567 (2d Dep't, 1899), aff'd, 162 N. Y. 405, 56 N. E. 979 (igoo).
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to institute an action at law.' 7 The primary purpose was to require foreign
law courts to accord full faith and credit to an equity decree so long as it was
not a decretal order.' Hence, it appears that the expression was adopted
for its convenience in tersely signifying that a final decree was such a judg-
ment as would be capable of supporting an action of debt.19 But declaring
an alimony decree to be a "debt" and therefore adequately remedial at law begs
the question, because, although what is owing may be called a "debt" to enable
the institution of a suit for its recovery at law, the adequacy of the remedy might
be dependent upon the nature of the claim.20
Generally alimony is held to be an obligation of the same nature as that of
the marital duty to support."' It is not founded on a contract, express or implied,
but arises out of the relationship of marriage.2 2 Thus viewed, the decree does
not create a debt in the ordinary sense, but rather defines the husband's original
obligation.2
It has been said that the claim for alimony becomes merged in the decree,
and this becomes then a suit on a debt of a different sort from the petition for
alimony.2 4 But surely the "debt" thus created is a peculiar specie.2 5 It is not a
property right which is assignable.2 6  By the weight of authority, it is exempt
from garnishment,27 except if the debt had been contracted for necessaries, and
made after the divorce.28  Also, it is a "debt" which prevails over exemption
laws 29 and survives bankruptcy. 30 Further, the obligation to pay the alimony
17. Post v. Neafie, 3 Caines 22 (N. Y. 18o5). See Cook, The Powers of Courts of
Equity (19,5) 15 COL. L. REv. io6, 240. It was an answer to the divergent English views,
which held that as a chancery court was not a court of record, no action at law could be main-
tained upon a decree. The development of a chancery court to a court of record is discussed
in Barbour, The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree (igig) 17 MICH. L. REv.
527.
I8. Pennington v. Gibson, 16 How. 65 (U. S. 1853). But an action for debt will not lie
on a decretal order. Hugh v. Higgs, 8 Wheat. 697 (U. S. 1823).
ig. "The liability for unpaid alimony may not, strictly speaking, be a debt within the
legal meaning of the Word. But it gives to the wife in proceedings like this the right as a
creditor to enforce payment in the same manner and to as great an extent as if she were a
creditor in the most exact sense of the word." McIlroy v. McIlroy, 2o8 Mass. 458, 464, 94
N. E. 696, 699 (ig1).
20. "The law of merger as applied to judgments does not forbid all inquiry into the
nature of the cause of action." 2 FREEMAN, op. cit. supra note 3, § 55o.
21. 2 BisHop, op. cit. supra note 4, § 829; 2 SCHOULER, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, SEPARATION
& DOMEsTIc RELATIoNs (6th ed. 1921) § 1754.
22. 2 NELSON, DIVORCE & SEPARATION (1895) § 900.
23. Faversham v. Faversham, 161 App. Div. 521, 146 N. Y. Supp. 569 (ist Dep't, 1914).
24. 2 SCHOULER, op. cit. supra note 21, § 1861; see (1934) 1i N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 634.
25. For a discussion of some of the peculiar attributes of alimony, see Munson, Some
Aspects of the Nature of Permanent Alimony (1916) 16 COL. L. REV. 217.
26. Jordan v. Westerman, 62 Mich. 170, 28 N. W. 826 (1886) ; see Faversham v. Faver-
sham, 161 App. Div. 521, 523, 146 N. Y. Supp. 569, 571 (ist Dep't, 1914).
27. Wright v. Wright, 93 Conn. 296, 105 Atl. 684 (1919) ; Kingman v. Carter, 8 Kan.
App. 46, 54 Pac. 13 (1898); Romaine v. Chauncey, 129 N. Y. 566, 29 N. E. 826 (1892).
Contra: Kelso v. Lovejoy, 9 Ohio Cir. Ct. (N. s.) 539 (905), aff'd, 76 Ohio St. 598, 81 N. E.
1189 (1907) ; Scheffer v. Boy, 5 Pa. Cty. Ct. 158 (1888).
28. West v. Washburn, 153 App. Div. 460, 462, 138 N. Y. Supp. 23o, 231 (3d Dep't, 1912).
See Harper, Garnishment of Alimony (1928) 13 IOwA L. REV. 164.
29. Szymanski v. Szymanski, 188 Iowa 931, 176 N. W. 8o6 (192o) ; Johnson v. Johnson,
66 Kan. 546, 72 Pac. 267 (1903) ; Pearson v. Pearson, 166 Ky. 91, 178 S. W. 1164 (1915).
The weight of authority, however, is that execution will not reach a homestead if the decree
is not made a lien on the property, but a money judgment is taken. Ford v. Ford, 201 Ala.
519, 78 So. 873 (1918) ; Jackson v. Coleman, 115 Miss. 535, 76 So. 545 (I917). Contra:
Rogers v. Day, 115 Mich. 664, 74 N. W. 19o (1898) ; Kimmerly v. McMichael, 83 Neb. 789,
12o N. W. 487 (1909).
30. 42 STAT. 354, II U. S. C. A. § 35 (1927) ; Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U. S. 68 (19o4).
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does not survive the death of either party,31 and it has been held that the estate
of the deceased wife cannot recover from the husband the installments which had
accrued prior to her death.3 2 In addition, the determination of the amount of the
alimony is controlled by no fixed standards, but rests in the sound discretion of
the court,3 3 and the uniqueness of the "debt" becomes pronounced by the fact that
the amount awarded the wife is subject to modification by the court granting it,",
even as to accrued installments, 5 and may be stopped entirely upon the remar-
riage of the spouse to a person able to support her.3 6 In addition, imprisonment
for failure to pay does not violate constitutional provisions forbidding imprison-
ment for debt.3 7 It is well-settled that alimony is treated differently from other
debts in the domestic forum where it is accorded the full scope of equitable
enforcement, including injunction,8 sequestration, 9 receivership, 0 writ of tie
exeat,4' and contempt process. 42 Hence, it might be said that although the term
"debt" was used to describe accrued sums of alimony to enable a law suit to
be maintained on its account, yet, since its legal attributes vary greatly from
that of an ordinary money claim, and since the means of enforcement accorded
it locally, at least, are peculiar to it, the obligation should not be denied equitable
relief merely because it is labeled a "debt".
Alimony is awarded, primarily, to enable the divorced wife to maintain
herself and children, in order that they might not become public charges and
derelicts.4" The economic dependence of a wife upon a foreign state is just as
burdensome to it as it would have been to the domestic state had the wife not left
the latter. Therefore, the public interest of F-2 is directly affected by the wife's
ability to compel payment. In this connection, it must be considered that a judg-
ment at law can be evaded very easily. In fact, just as the respondent had left
the domestic state, perhaps to avoid payment, he as readily can leave the sister
31. Hazard v. Hazard, i97 Ill. App. 612 (I916); MADDExN, DOMESTIC RELATIONS (1931)§ g8.
32. Clark v. Clark, 6 W. & S. 85 (Pa. 1844) (divorce a mensa et thoro). However, the
executor of a deceased wife was permitted to recover accrued installments even against the
deceased husband's estate. Van Ness v. Ransom, 215 N. Y. 557, Iog N. E. 593 (915).
33. Dietrick v. Dietrick, 88 N. J. Eq. 56o, 103 AtI. 242 (918) ; Toncray v. Toncray, 123
Tenn. 476, 131 S. W. 977 (igio).
34. Cohen v. Cohen, I5O Cal. 99, 88 Pac. 267 (19o6) ; Hughes v. Hughes, 68 Cal. App.
I95, 228 Pac. 675 (1924) ; Dietrick v. Dietrick, 88 N. J. Eq. 560, 103 Atl. 242 (I918).
35. Emerson v. Emerson, I2O Md. 584, 87 Ati. 1033 (1913).
36. Cohen v. Cohen, i5o Cal. 99, 88 Pac. 267 (i9o6) ; Morgan v. Lowman, 8o Ill. App.
557 (1898). But if the second husband is unable to support the wife, and especially if there
are minor children, reduced alimony may be retained. Southworth v. Southworth, i68 Mass.
5I1, 47 N. E. 93 (897) ; Hartigan v. Hartigan, r42 Minn. 274, 171 N. W. 925 (I919).
37. Ex parte Spencer, 83 Cal. 460, 23 Pac. 395 (i89o) ; Bushman v. Bushman, 157 Md.
i66, i45 Atl. 488 (1929) ; Richards v. Richards, 71 Misc. 532, i3o N. Y. Supp. 799 (Sup. Ct.
1911).
38. In re White, 113 Cal. 282, 45 Pac. 323 (1896) ; Errissman v. Errissman, 25 Ill. 136
(830).
39. Casteel v. Casteel, 38 Ark. 477 (1882).
40. Stallings v. Stallings, 127 Ga. 464, 56 S. E. 469 (1907) ; Barker v. Dayton, 28 Wis.
367 (871).
41. McGee v. McGee, 8 Ga. 295 (1850) ; Boucicault v. Boucicault, 21 Hun. 431 (N. Y.
i88o).
42. Wightman v. Wightman, 45 Ill. 167 (1867) ; Foster v. Foster, 130 Mass. 189 (i88o).
43. Fanchier v. Gammill, 148 Miss. 723, 114 So. 813 (1927) ; MADDEx, loC. cit. supra
note 31.
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state, and should the contumacious husband send his property to a third state, the
wife would be unable to receive satisfaction.44
The adequacy of the legal remedy from the wife's viewpoint is obviously
defective, since recovery is seldom had until the lapse of a long period after the
institution of suit. While an ordinary money judgment is awarded as reimburse-
ment or compensation, alimony is decreed for use in a particular manner, namely,
for the maintenance of the wife and children, and comparably to her pre-divorce
days.45 What is the wife to do until the law judgment is recovered and satisfied?
People are loath to extend credit on faith in a future judgment, and the alimony
probably would not have been granted if the wife had been able to maintain her-
self without the fund.46 In the case of installment alimony, not only are the
preceding reasons applicable for the extension of equitable relief, but in addition
a new action at law would be necessary as each installment became due; and the
avoidance of a multiplicity of suits is not an uncommon basis for equity juris-
diction.
4 7
Some courts have denied equitable relief on the ground that the mode of
execution provided by the laws of the state which had rendered the decree is not,
by operation of the full faith and credit clause, obligatory upon the courts of
another state wherein the judgment is sought to be enforced.48  However, the
problem is whether a state, by reason of comity or in order to fulfill the purposes
of this peculiar type of money decree, ought to grant the use of equity process,
and not whether it is compelled to do so.
It is sometimes said that a court of equity is without power to enforce any
but its own decrees, nor can it adjudge the decree of any other court binding or
punish the violation of any but its own decree.49 However, the court is not asked
to enforce a foreign decree; it is asked to "establish" the foreign decree as its
own or "to recognize such decree as affording a binding equitable obligation upon
which a new decree may be founded".50
The recognition of equitable rights established by a foreign court as the
basis for a new decree has considerable support in the law.51 The cases have
arisen principally upon the attempt of one party who has been declared by F-i to
have certain equitable relations to land in F-2, to exercise a right thus created or
refuse a duty imposed. In Burnley v. Stevenson, it was said that as the perform-
ance of the duty to convey could have been enforced by contempt proceedings,
". .. the fact that the conveyance was not made in pursuance of the order,
does not affect the validity of the decree in so far as it determined the equitable
rights of the parties .. . " 2 It would seem that jurisdictions in accord with
44. This was the factual situation in Cummings v. Cummings, 97 Cal. App. 144, 275 Pac.
245 (1929).
45. 2 BisHoP, loc. cit. supra note 4.
46. 2 BisHop, op. cit. supra note 4, § 1012 et seq.; 2 SCHOULER, op. Cit. mupra note 21,
§ 1814 et seq.
47. Murphy v. Lincoln, 63 Vt. 278, 22 Atl. 418 (891). Some courts have dismissed a
bill seeking equitable relief without distinguishing between lump sum and installment alimony.
Grant v. Grant, 75 F. (2d) 665 (App. D. C. 1935).
48. Bennett v. Bennett, 63 N. 3. Eq. 306, 49 Atl. 5O, (1903) ; Lynde v. Lynde, 162 N. Y.
405, 56 N. E. 979 09oo).
49. Adams v. Knapp, 213 Pa. 567, 63 Atl. 1112 (19o6).
5o. This view is affirmatively expressed by Prof. Barbour, loc. cit. supra note 17.
5I. Redwood Investment Co. v. Exley, 64 Cal. App. 455, 221 Pac. 973 (1923) ; Spalding
v. Spalding, 75 Cal. App. 569, 243 Pac. 445 (1925) ; Dunlap v. Byers, io Mich. log, 67 N. W.
1O67 (1896) ; Niles v. Lee, 169 Mich. 474, 135 N. W. 274 (1912).
52. 24 Ohio St. 474, 478 (1873).
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Burnley v. Stevenson would readily extend the use of their equitable aid in the
enforcement of a marital duty which could have been enforced "by contempt
proceedings". 53 As their decisions have been based upon the equitable obligation
imposed by the equity court of the sister state rather than the compulsion of full
faith and credit, and since the sister state had no jurisdictional control over the
res, while it had such control over the marriage status, a decree founded upon the
marital duty established by a foreign court 5 4 would be in consonance with the
postulate that "an equity decree may be pleaded as a cause of action in another
state", and would not even offend the theory of state sovereignty which many
courts have applied in refusing to found decrees on equitable obligations con-
cerning conveyances of land.5
The argument that on the one hand the land is existent, while the marital
status has been dissolved and that the alimony suit is but an ancillary proceeding,
and, therefore, there is no res to which the latter can attach, is not formidable,
because of the well-known doctrine that equity looks through form to substance.58
Alimony issues out of the marriage status, the dissolution of which might have
been dependent upon faith in continued support, since one would rather bear
personal indignities, etc., in preference to being left destitute.
Some courts have declined to extend equitable remedies to the enforcement
of a foreign money alimony decree on the ground that, by statute, those remedies
are applicable only to decrees rendered in an "action for divorce", and that a suit
for the recovery of alimony awarded by a sister state is not an "action for
divorce" within the meaning of the statute.5 7 The present New York act,58 how-
ever, expressly authorizes the use of certain remedial measures, such as seques-
tration and receivership, provided the cause for the foreign divorce is a ground
recognized in New York. 9 It has been held that under this enactment, a suit on
the foreign decree is not an equitable action, but one for the recovery of a money
judgment, to which the statutory remedy relates.8 0 Whereas New York must be
commended on its effort to provide greater security, still it seems that the cause
for the divorce ought not to be the determinative factor for the issuance of relief.
The pecuniary distress of the divorced spouse is not alleviated by a separation
resulting from a ground other than adultery.
Inasmuch as, in the absence of statutory prohibition, there is no legal princi-
ple which forbids the extension by F-2 of its equity process in the enforcement
53. Matson v. Matson, 186 Iowa 6o7, 173 N. W. 127 (i919) ; Mallette v. Scheerer, 164
Wis. 4,5, 16o N. W. 182 (igi6).
54. See Pound, The Progress of the Law-Equity (919) 33 HARv. L. Rzv. 42o, wherein
the author decries the theory of the cases which have founded decrees conveying land on the
equitable rights established by a foreign court.
55. Bullock v. Bullock, 51 N. J. Eq. 444, 27 At. 435 (1893) ; Fall v. Fall, 75 Neb. 104,
io6 N. W. 412 (1905). Prof. Barbour believes that Bullock v. Bullock and Fall v. Fall were
wrongly decided, as full faith and credit ought to have been given since the equitable rights of
the parties had been settled. Barbour, loc. cit. supra note 33. See 2 BLACK, JUDGMENTS (2d
ed. 1902) § 872; Goodrich, Enforcement of a Foreign Equitable Decree (1915) 5 IowA LAw
BULL. 230 (the principle of Matson v. Matson upheld).
56. BILLs N, EQUITY IN ITS RELATION TO THE COMMON LAW (1917) 97; CLARK,
EQUITY (1919) § 19.
57. Mayer v. Mayer, 154 Mich. 386, 117 N. W. 89o (1908) ; Wood v. Wood, 7 Misc. 579,
28 N. Y. Supp. 154 (C. P. 1894).
58. N. Y. Civ. PRAc. ACT (Cahill, 1931) § 1171.
59. Id. at § 1147. However, the act does not include decrees from foreign countries. Bois-
sevain v. Boissevain, 252 N. Y. 178, 169 N. E. 130 (1929).
6o. Beeck v. Beeck, 211 App. Div. 720, 208 N. Y. Supp. 98 (Ist Dep't, 1925).
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of an F-i money alimony decree, it is submitted that its widespread adoption
would be highly desirable. It is an expression of a humane attitude which com-
prehends the need of financially securing to a wife and children the enjoyment of
a comfortable life. It is a means which will tend to limit the number of public
charges that have been compelled to seek succor from the state. It is a method
whereby a recalcitrant husband will be rendered less able to avoid the obligations
imposed upon him at the dissolution of the marital status. Furthermore, a state
should accord to a similar decree rendered by a foreign court the same facilities
for satisfaction made available by it for its own decree. Therefore, the "non-
technical view" seems to be preferable, since ". . . to the ordinary mind, un-
troubled by legal nuances, the money due from the defendant remains alimony,
wherever they or either may be." 61
M.S.F.
61. Ostrander v. Ostrander, igo Minn. 547, 549, 252 N. W. 449, 450 (1934).
